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This paper characterizes the optimal auction in a two-period model under non-commitment. In the
ﬁrst period, a risk-neutral seller designs a mechanism to sell an indivisible object. If no trade takes place,
the seller cannot commit not to try to sell the object in the second period. Assuming independent private
values and risk neutral buyers we show that the seller can implement a revenue maximizing allocation
rule by running a ‘Myerson’ auction with buyer-speciﬁcc u t o ﬀs in each period. A buyer can either
claim a type above his/her cut-oﬀ or claim the lowest possible type. If no buyer claims a value above
his/her cutoﬀ, no trade takes place in the ﬁrst period, and the seller runs a ‘Myerson’ auction in the
second period with lower cutoﬀs. If the buyers are ex-ante symmetric, this rule can be implemented by a
sequence of second or ﬁrst price auctions with a reservation price in each period. The reservation price
decreases overtime. The paper also develops a general procedure to characterize the optimal dynamic
incentive schemes under non-commitment in asymmetric information environments with multiple agents,
when types are drawn from a continuum. Keywords: mechanism design, optimal auctions, sequential
rationality. JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: C72, D44, D82.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The classical work on optimal auctions (see Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981)) characterizes
the revenue-maximizing allocation mechanism for a risk-neutral seller who owns one object and faces a
ﬁxed number of buyers whose valuation is private information. An important assumption in these papers is
that the seller can commit to withdraw the item from the market in the event that it is not sold.1 In other
words, the seller is free to employ any mechanism to sell the object but once it is determined the seller
should respect it forever. The assumption that the seller can commit to the outcome of the mechanism
is far-fetched and often not met in reality. Auction houses very seldom remove from the market items
that remain unsold. For instance, Christies in Chicago auctions the same bottles of wine that failed to
sell in earlier auctions. The US government re-auctions properties that fail to sell: lumber tracts, oil tracts
and real estate are put up for a new auction if no bidder bids above the reserve price.2 As Porter (1995)
reports, 46.8 percent of the oil and gas tracts with rejected high bids were put up for a new auction. The
mean time elapsed between the ﬁrst and the second auction is 2.7 years.
The inability of a seller to commit to a given institution in the event that it fails to realize all gains
of trade, has been studied extensively in the durable good monopolist literature, (Bulow (1982), Gul-
Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986), Stokey (1981)), and by a more recent paper in an auction set-up by
McAfee and Vincent (1997). A crucial assumption in these papers is that the seller’s action in each stage is
restricted to be out of a speciﬁc class. The seller chooses prices in the durable goods case, and reservation
prices in the paper by McAfee and Vincent. It is interesting and relevant to investigate what is the optimal
procedure among all possible ones. This paper obtains a characterization in the following environment.
There is a risk neutral seller who owns a single object and faces I risk neutral buyers, whose valuation
is private information and is drawn from a continuum. Moreover valuations are private and independently
distributed across buyers. There are 2 periods and the buyers and the seller discount the future with the
same discount factor. At the beginning of each period the seller proposes a mechanism to sell the object. If
t h eo b j e c ti ss o l da tt h ee n do ft h eﬁrst period, the game ends otherwise the seller returns the next period
and oﬀers a new mechanism. The game ends after 2 periods even if the object remains unsold. This is
the simplest possible environment that allows us to examine the eﬀect of having limited commitment on
the optimal mechanism. We show that the seller will maximize expected discounted revenue by running at
t=1 a ‘Myerson’ auction with buyer-speciﬁcc u t o ﬀs. A ‘Myerson’ auction assigns the object to the buyer
with the highest virtual valuation if it is above a cut-oﬀ. A buyer can either claim a type above his/her
1 No sale is not the only form of ineﬃciency of the classical optimal auction. Sometimes is allocates the object ineﬃciently,
thus leaving open resale opportunities for the new owner. A recent paper by Zheng (2002) studies optimal auctions optimum
given resale.
2These examples are also mentioned in McAfee and Vincent (1997).
2cut-oﬀ or claim the lowest possible type. If no bidder claims a value above his/her cut-oﬀ,n ot r a d et a k e s
place in the ﬁrst period and the seller runs a ‘Myerson’ auction in the second period.
This is the ﬁrst work that studies a mechanism design problem under non-commitment in a multi-agent
asymmetric information environment. Mechanism design under non-commitment is notoriously diﬃcult
even in single agent environments. In our multi-agent environment the main diﬃculties are two.
The ﬁrst diﬃculty is due to the fact that one cannot use the revelation principle. Our ﬁrst insight is
a general method to characterize the optimal mechanism in environments where the revelation principle
is of no help. How can one characterize the optimal mechanisms, when one potentially needs to consider
mechanisms with arbitrary messages? The idea is to characterize equilibrium outcomes. Outcomes is all
that matters for payoﬀs and in mechanism design we care primarily for payoﬀs. This method of solving
dynamic mechanism design problems under non-commitment was developed in Skreta (2004). As the
current paper illustrates, it can be used in multi-agent environments and potentially it can be used to
characterize equilibrium outcomes of other solution concepts.
The second diﬃculty is speciﬁc to multi-agent environments. In those environments one has to address
the possibility that the mechanism designer knows more about the agents, then the agents do about their
opponents at the end of the ﬁrst period. For instance, if the seller used a sealed-bid mechanism at t =1
she has observed the bids of all the buyers, but buyer i has not observed the bids of his opponents. In
other words, the seller at t =2becomes an informed principal, since she possesses information that is not
available to the agents.3 The seller at t =1controls to a very large extend the amount of information that
is released to the buyers, since she can determine by the mechanism she employs how much more she will
know relative to the buyers at t =2 . In other words, in our setup one of the seller’s choices is to determine
the optimal amount of information that should be revealed to the buyers at the beginning of the second
period.4 Moreover it is possible that the seller releases diﬀerent information to diﬀerent buyer. Then it is
possible that at t =2 , the beliefs of buyer A about buyer B0s valuation may be diﬀerent from the ones
of buyer C. That is, at t =2 beliefs maybe part of the players private information. Also, the seller by
revealing certain information may be able to introduce correlation in the buyers’ beliefs about each other’s
valuation at the beginning of t =2 . In general institutions are not only characterized by the allocations
3There is some work on mechanism design by an informed principal by Maskin and Tirole (1990) and (1992). Those papers
consider the single agent case in two scenarios, the one where the principal’s private information does not aﬀect the payoﬀ of
the agent and the case where is does. In our problem, the seller becomes informed endogenously, since she obtains her private
information by interacting with the buyers in period t =1 . This information aﬀects i
0s expected payoﬀs, hence we are in a
common value setting according to the terminology of Maskin and Tirole (1992). The question of mechanism design by an
informed principal that faces multiple agents, is an important yet open and challenging question.
4This does not arise in a single agent framework under non-commitment since there the seller does never have more
information than the buyer.
3they lead to, but also by the amount of information they release to their participants. In order to capture
these issues a mechanism in this environment consists of three objects: a game form, a communication
device (mediator), whose purpose is to coordinate play, and an information disclosure policy whose purpose
is to capture the degree of transparency of an institution. A buyer can always choose not participate in a
mechanism if he wishes to do so.
The solution is characterized under the following assumptions (i) the seller at each stage observes the
actions chosen by the buyers and whether trade took place or not, (ii) the distribution of valuations has a
strictly positive and continuous density and satisﬁes the monotone hazard rate property, (iii) (Assumption
O) the history where all buyers choose not to participate in the ﬁrst-period mechanism becomes common
knowledge (vi) a buyer chooses not to participate if indiﬀerent, (v) buyers employ pure strategies.
It is very natural to assume that if all buyers walk away without participating in the mechanism that the
seller proposed at t =1 , this is observed by everyone. This is the only restriction imposed on the information
disclosure policy employed by the seller. In other words, we assume that the seller employs an information
disclosure policy that makes public information the event that all buyers have rejected the mechanism
that she proposed at t =1 , (Assumption O). Given this relatively minor restriction we characterized the
revenue maximizing PBE. No other restrictions were imposed on the information disclosure policy. The
seller can send whatever messages she wishes in all other circumstances, which can lead to a second period
problem with correlation and with beliefs being private information. Moreover, no assumptions are made
about whether the seller commits to tell the truth, or not, or reveal part of the truth via her information
disclosure policy. We characterized the optimal mechanism without having to deal directly with all these
complications by doing the following. We look at outcomes that arise from assessments where the players’
strategy proﬁle is restricted to be sequentially rational only after all buyers rejected the mechanism at
t =1 . Clearly this set of outcomes contains all the ones that arise at a PBE, s i n c ea taPBE players
behave sequentially rationally at each node, and hence after the history where all buyers rejected the
ﬁrst-period mechanism, M1. We call this the set of conditionally sequentially rational outcomes, CSR(all
reject). It turns out, that at the revenue maximizing outcome out of this larger set, trade will take place
with probability 1 at t =1unless everybody rejects M1. Put diﬀerently, the optimal outcome for the
seller out of this larger set is a PBE outcome. In other words, we solved a program ignoring most of the
sequential rationality constraints - we just required sequential rationality after one history - the one where
everybody rejects M1. It turned out that the optimum satisﬁes all constraints - since the only case that
we move on to t =2is whenever everybody rejects M1.
Apart from the optimal auction literature this work is related to the literature of dynamic mechanism
design under non-commitment. The early papers on dynamic mechanism design, (Freixas, Guesnerie and
Tirole (1985), FGT, Hart and Tirole (1988), Laﬀont and Tirole (1988), LT), establish that under non-
4commitment the principal cannot appeal to the standard revelation principle in order to characterize the
optimal mechanism. This makes the characterization of the optimal contract very diﬃcult,5 and is the
main reason why the research on mechanism design in dynamic settings under non-commitment has not
progressed much. For this reason, FGT (1985) characterize the optimal incentive schemes among the
class of linear incentive schemes. LT (1988) consider arbitrary schemes but examine only special classes
of equilibria, namely pooling and partition equilibria. A remarkable result is derived in a recent paper
by Bester and Strausz (2001), BS. They show that when the principal faces one agent whose type space
is ﬁnite, she can, without loss of generality, restrict attention to mechanisms where the message space
has the same cardinality as the type space. As BS illustrate, in order to ﬁnd the optimal mechanism
one has to check which incentive compatibility constraints are binding. In an environment with limited
commitment, constraints may be binding ‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’. Even if one could obtain an analog
of the BS result for the continuum type case, it does not seem straightforward to generalize the procedure
of checking which incentive compatibility constraints are binding. Moreover, as Bester and Strausz (2000)
report, their version of the revelation principle for environments of limited commitment does not extend
to the case that the principal faces many agents. This paper provides a method that does.
The paper is structured as follows. The environment under consideration is described in Section 2.
Section 3 outlines our method for characterizing the optimal mechanism under non-commitment. The
main analysis and results of this work can be found in Section 4, which is the core of the paper. Section 5
illustrates how to calculate the optimal auction. Concluding remarks are in Section 6. All proofs that are
not in the main text can be found in the Appendix.
2T h e E n v i r o n m e n t
A risk neutral seller owns a unit of an indivisible object, and faces I risk neutral buyers. The seller’s
valuation for the object is zero, whereas that of buyer i is drawn from and interval [ai,b i] a c c o r d i n gt oa
strictly positive and continuous density fi. A buyer’s valuation vi is private and independently distributed
across buyers. Time is discrete and the game lasts two periods, t =1 ,2. The buyers and the seller discount
the future with the same discount factor δ. All elements of the game except the realization of the buyers’
valuations are common knowledge. The seller’s goal is to maximize expected discounted revenue. The
buyers aim to maximize expected surplus.
5See the discussion in Laﬀont and Tirole (1993), Ch. 9, and Salanie (1998), Ch.6.
5Notation
Vi =[ ai,b i],i ∈ I, denotes the set of buyer i0s all possible valuations
V = V1 × V2 × ... × VI, denotes the set
of all possible vectors of valuations of all the buyers
V−i = V1 × .. × Vi−1 × Vi+1... × VI, stands for the set of
all possible vectors of valuations of I\{i}.
v =( v1,v 2,...,v I), denotes a vector of valuations of all the buyers
v−i =( v1,v 2,...,v i−1,v i+1,..,v I), denotes a vector of valuations of I\{i}.
f = f1 × f2 × ... × fI, denotes the joint pdf of v on V.
f−i = f1 × .. × fi−1 × fi+1... × fI, denotes the joint pdf of v−i on V−i.
Timing
t =1
seller proposes a “mechanism” - buyers choose their actions- TRADE - Game ends - NO TRADE
go to t =2
t =2
seller proposes a “mechanism”− buyers choose their actions - Game ends
A mechanism, Mt, consists of a game form,acommunication system (mediator) and an information
disclosure policy.




available to the buyers and an outcome function γt : St → [0,1]I × RI.
The outcome speciﬁed via γt(st), where st =( st
1,s t
2,...,s t
I), is a probability that each buyer obtains the
good, rt(st)=[ r1(st),r 2(st),...,r I(st)], such that
PI
i=1 rt
i(st) ≤ 1 and rt
i(st) ≥ 0 and an expected payment
for each buyer zt(st)=[ zt
1(st),zt
2(st),...,z I(st)].
Deﬁnition 2 (Communication System) Let Bt
i denote the set of reports buyer i c a ns e n di n t ot h ec o m -
munication system and Nt
i set of messages buyer i can receive from the communication system. A com-
m u n i c a t i o ns y s t e mi sam a p sav e c t o ro fr e p orts of the buyers to a vector of messages.
6The purpose of a communication system is to coordinate play
Example: Buyer 1: β1 =my valuation is low; Buyer 2: β2 =my valuation is 5, n1(β1,β2)= bid 1,
n2(β1,β2)= bid 4.
Deﬁnition 3 (Information Disclosure Policy) A information disclosure policy is a mapping from the vector
of actions chosen by the buyers to a vector of messages, one for each buyer, or Dt : St → ∆(Λt) where
Λt := ×i∈KΛt
i and Λt
i is the set of messages that the seller can send to buyer i.
Purpose: Capture that two diﬀerent mechanisms diﬀer in amount of information they release to par-
ticipants. In a multi-agent dynamic problem under non-commitment, an important feature of an institution
is the amount of information agents acquire from their interaction at t =1 , since information will aﬀect
their beliefs about their opponents, which will in turn aﬀect their future interaction t =2 .A n dt w od i ﬀer-
ent mechanisms that implement the same allocation may release diﬀerent amounts of information to their
participants. For instance, in the case of symmetric buyers, the symmetric equilibrium of a second price
sealed bid auction and the symmetric equilibrium of an English auction will allocate the good in the same
way, but in the SPA buyers observe only who won the object, whereas in an English Auction participants
observe the drop-out prices of everyone. Information revelation at t =1may be very important for the
interaction of the buyers at t =2and consequently for the revenue that the seller can expect to extract.
A buyer can always choose not to participate in a mechanism. We model this by assuming that every
game form that the seller can propose, contains an action si =0 i for all i such that
ri(0i,s −i)=0and zi(0i,s −i)=0for all s−i.
If a buyer chooses 0i he does not get the object and he does not pay anything no matter what the other
buyers do. For instance if the mechanism is a FPA with a reserve price, then submitting a bid below the
reserve price implies that no matter what your opponents do, you will not get the object and will not pay
anything.
Deﬁnition 4 We say that buyer i rejects M1 if he chooses 0i at t =1 .
Let M denote the set of all possible mechanisms. The seller’s information set in period t is identiﬁed
with an element of Ht
S, where Ht
S is the set of all feasible histories at date t. Similarly, buyer i0si n f o r m a t i o n
set is an element of Ht
B(i). An element of Ht
S,( Ht
B(i)), is denoted by ht
S, (ht
i). A strategy for the seller, σS,
consists of a sequence of maps from Ht
S to M.Apure communication strategy of buyer i, σB(i), consists of
sequence of 2 mappings: a mapping from V i ×Ht
B(i) t oar e p o r t ,Bt
i, and a mapping from V i ×Ht
B(i) ×Nt
i
to an action. The set of feasible actions for a buyer at t =1 ,2 is determined by the mechanism that




strategy proﬁle σ =( σj)j=S,B, speciﬁes a strategy for each player. A belief system, µ, maps Ht
S to the set
of probability distributions over V.
We make the following assumptions:
(i) Buyers employ pure Strategies
(ii) The seller observes the actions, that is the vector s, chosen by the buyers and whether trade took
place or not.
(iii) The history when all choose not to participate at t =1becomes common knowledge, (Assumption
O).
(iv) A buyer does not participate if indiﬀerent




is strictly increasing in vi
Our aim is to characterize the maximum expected revenue that the seller can guarantee at a PBE.A s
usual we require that strategies yield a BNE, not only for the whole game, but also for the continuation
game starting at each t after every history.
3 The Methodology
3.1 The revelation principle is of no help
As it is well known, the question in a mechanism design problem is to ﬁnd the optimal, given a criterion,
institution among all possible ones. This is quite a task because the analyst typically cannot even describe
the set of all possible institutions. The revelation principle provides a parsimonious way to characterize
the set of all social choice functions that can be implemented by a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a game
where the principal’s strategy space is the set of all possible mechanisms. It points out that this set
is equal to the one that can be implemented at a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the simpler version of the
original game where the principal’s strategy space is the set of direct mechanisms The characterization
provided is complete, in the sense that necessary and suﬃcient conditions for feasibility are provided. In
a dynamic setup under non-commitment one is interested in what can be implemented in a PBE.F o r
this solution concept there is no result analogous to the revelation principle that provides necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for implementability. And, as it was realized in the earlier literature on mechanism
design under non-commitment, (LT 1988), one cannot use the standard revelation principle in each period.
8To see why, suppose that at period one the seller employs a direct revelation mechanism, buyers have
claimed their true valuations, and according to this mechanism no trade takes place. If the seller behaves
sequentially rationally, she will try to sell the object at t =2u s i n gad i ﬀerent mechanism. And in the case
that the buyers have revealed their true valuations at t =1 , the seller has complete information at t =2 .
She can therefore use this information to extract all the surplus from the highest valuation buyer. In this
situation buyers will have an incentive to manipulate the seller’s beliefs. One would expect that they will
not always reveal their valuations truthfully at the beginning of the relationship. The seller, since she does
not have commitment power, cannot play the role of the “machine” that exogenously speciﬁes the direct
revelation game that implements an equilibrium of some general game.
What we are interested in here is the set of social choice functions that can be implemented at a PBE
of the game. (Clearly, this is a subset of the BNE−implementable social choice functions.) In particular,
we are interested in the one that generates maximal revenue for the seller. One could obtain that by
brute force: the mechanisms employed at t =2depend on the seller’s posterior and the information that
buyers have at that stage. Along the equilibrium path, posteriors are determined by Bayes rule from the
buyers’ strategies, the mechanism proposed by the seller, the actions chosen by the buyers, and the seller’s
information disclosure policy. There can be inﬁnitely many vectors of choices at t =1that end up in
no trade since lotteries are allowed. Each of these choices leads to a diﬀerent posterior which determines
the optimal period-2 mechanism. And at the optimum the mechanism at t =1must be optimally chosen
taking into account not only revenue at t =1but also what beliefs the seller and the buyers will have
after each history where there is no trade at t =1 , which in turn will determine the optimal mechanism
for t =2 . This is very complicated. We choose to proceed indirectly by looking at outcomes of the whole
game.
3.2 Allocation Rules and Payment Rules
G i v e nas t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle, (σS,σ1
B,σ2
B,...,σI
B) and a belief system, µ, we can calculate for each realization of
v =( v1,v 2,...,v I) the ex-ante probability that buyer i obtains the object, pi(σ,µ)(vi,v −i) and the ex-ante
expected discounted payment is denoted by xi(σ,µ)(vi,v −i). This is the set of expected discounted outcomes
of the game given (σ,µ).6 The rule pi(σ,µ)(v), sometimes abbreviated as pi, maps V to probabilities, and
denotes the expected, discounted probability that buyer i will obtain the object given (σ,µ) when the
6We need to include the belief system in the arguments of p and x because it is part of the equilibrium concepts we will
examine.





1{trade with i at t}|(σ,µ),v
¤
.
Allocation rules will play a central role in our analysis. It is possible that diﬀerent strategy proﬁles lead
to the same allocation rule. The rule xi(σ,µ)(v), sometimes abbreviated as xi(v), maps V into R and we





1{trade with i at t} ·{ i’s expected payment at t}|(σ,µ),v
¤
.
In the environment under consideration, a buyer is uncertain about the outcome of an action he chooses
because it depends on the actions chosen by the other buyers. Given the actions of the other buyers, i0s
action leads to an outcome which is a lottery; the outcome of a vector of actions - one action for each
buyer - is a probability that each buyer obtains the object and an expected payment. When buyer i takes
an action he does not know the actions of the other buyers, thus he can only determine a probability
distribution over lotteries associated with each of his potential actions. These probability distributions
depend on the other buyers’ strategies and on i0s beliefs about their valuations. In order to obtain i0s











B buyer i0s expected discounted payoﬀ from σi
B(vi) is given by
Ui
σ,µ(vi,σi
B(vi)) = ¯ pi(σ,µ)(vi)vi − ¯ xi(σ,µ)(vi).
Often we will omit (σ,µ) from the arguments of pi,x i, ¯ pi, ¯ xi , we just write for instance pi(v).
3.3 The Procedure
We start by examining the outcomes that arise from arbitrary strategy proﬁles. Then we examine how
the structure of the outcomes of the game will be aﬀected by restrictions on (σ,µ) dictated by a solution
concept, in our case PBE.In other words, a solution concept imposes restrictions on (σ,µ), which in turn
translate to restrictions on p and x. Our objective is to characterize outcomes arising from assessments,
(σ,µ), that consist Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of this game and choose the one that maximizes revenue
10for the seller. We ﬁrst look at the restrictions imposed on the allocation rule p by requiring (σ,µ) to be a
Bayes-Nash Equilibrium, BNE, of the game. We show that if σi
B is a best response to σS and to σ−i
B , then
the expectation of p over v−i , that is ¯ pi, is increasing in vi, and we can write the seller’s expected revenue
as a linear function of p. Our objective then reduces to identifying a PBE,that implements an allocation
rule p∗ which maximizes expected discounted revenue among all allocation rules implemented by a PBE
of the game. But the set of PBE implementable allocations is very diﬃcult to characterize because beliefs
may be private information at t =2 . What we do is to focus on a superset of these allocations. We look
at allocations implemented by strategy proﬁles where the seller behaves sequentially rationally at t =2
only after the history where all buyers rejected the ﬁrst period mechanism. This is the set of conditionally
sequentially rational allocations at the history all reject, CSR(all reject).7 It is relatively straightforward
to characterize this set and it turns out that the optimal allocation among CSR(all reject) is implemented
by an assessment that is a PBE.
4 The Optimal Mechanism Under Non-Commitment
4.1 Necessary Conditions at a BNE
Our goal is to investigate the properties of allocation rules that are implemented by a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium, PBE. In this subsection we look at the restrictions on p i m p o s e db yr e q u i r i n g(σ,µ) to be
a Bayes-Nash Equilibrium, BNE, of the game. In the following subsection we will study implications of
the requirement that (σ,µ) yields a BNE for the continuation game starting at each t after any history,
(sequential rationality).
A PBE is a BNE so ﬁrst we look at Necessary Conditions at a BNE.
Lemma 1 (Myerson (1981)). If p,x are implemented by a BNE the following conditions must hold:




ai ¯ pi(si)dsi + Ui
σ,µ(ai,σB(i)(ai))
(iii) Ui
σ,µ(ai,σB(i)(ai)) ≥ 0 and (iv) Σi∈Ipi(v) ≤ 1,p i(v) ≥ 0 for all i.



















7This is approximately accurate, in the sense that we obtain a consequence of sequential rationality after other histories at
t =2 , without though characterizing the optimal t =2mechanism at those histories.
11Summarizing, from the above analysis it follows that if for all i ∈ K, i0s strategy is a best response to
σS and σ−i
B , ¯ pi is an increasing function of vi and expected revenue for the seller from employing σS is






A Benchmark: The Solution under Commitment (Myerson (1981))





We will assume that Φ0
is are strictly increasing in vi. As u ﬃcient condition for this is that fi satisﬁes the
monotone hazard rate assumption.
Assumption MHR is equivalent to the following condition
f0
i(vi)[1 − Fi(vi)] ≥− f2
i (vi). (4)
The monotone hazard rate assumption is standard in the literature of mechanism design.
Maximizing (2) subject to the constraint that ¯ pi is increasing in vi gives the revenue maximizing
allocation rule among all BNE implementable ones. We maximize (2) pointwise ignoring for the moment
the constraint that ¯ pi is increasing in vi. Let ξ1
i denote the solution of Φi(vi)=0 , which given MHR, if it
exists, it will be unique; if Φi(vi) > 0 for all vi than set ξi = ai and deﬁne
Ξ1 = ×i∈I[ai,ξ1
i]. (5)
This is the region V where the virtual valuations of all buyers are negative. The optimal BNE imple-
mentable allocation rule assigns the object to the buyer with the highest virtual valuation, if his virtual
valuation is non-negative, that is
for v ∈ Ξ1 pC
i (v)=0for all i (6)
for v ∈ V \Ξ1 pC
i (v)=1for i = IC(v,f)
and pC
j (v)=0 and j 6= IC(v,f),
where IC(v,f) stands for the buyer that has the highest virtual valuation at vector v, that is IC(v,f)i∈I ∈
argmaxΦi(vi).8 Given v−i if buyer i obtains the object when his valuation is vi, he also obtains the object
with valuation v0
i >v i. Therefore pC is such that ¯ pi is increasing in vi. This allocation rule maximizes the





8Given MHR ties occur with probability zero, and can be broken arbitrarily.
12makes the second term equal to zero. As is it well known from the analysis in Myerson (1981), when the
buyers are ex-ante symmetric, in the regular case, this allocation and payment rule can be implemented
at the symmetric equilibrium of a ﬁrst price auction or a second price auction with a reservation price ξ1.
4.2 The Seller’s Second-Period Problem
In order to identify the restrictions that sequential rationality imposes on p, we need to study the seller’s
behavior at the ﬁnal period of the game. At a PBE(σ,µ), at a continuation game that starts at t =2after
a history where trade did not occur at t =1the seller’s strategy speciﬁes a mechanism that implements an
allocation that maximizes her expected revenue among all allocations that can be implemented at a BNE
of this continuation game.
In the case that the buyers’ valuations are fully revealed after some history h2
S, the seller’s problem at
t =2is trivial. She names a price equal to the highest valuation and extracts all the surplus from the bidder
whose valuation is the highest. In what follows we analyze the case where the seller is uncertain about
the buyers’ valuations at the beginning of period t =2 . We will use r2 and z2 to denote respectively the
allocation rule and payment rule implemented by the seller’s and the buyers’ actions at a continuation game
at t =2 . The seller’s continuation strategy at t =2is the mechanism that she proposes. A continuation
strategy of a buyer is a mapping from his type, which consists of everything that is not common knowledge
at that information set, to actions. In case that the seller employs a public information disclosure policy
at t =1 ,i 0s type will just consist of his valuation vi; if the seller employs a private information disclosure
policy at t =1 , then i0s type will consist of vi, and the message he received from the seller at t =1 ,λ i.
Hence given a strategy proﬁle of the continuation game that starts at t =2t h ea l l o c a t i o nr u l ea n dt h e
payment rule, r2 and z2 are in general going to be functions of valuations and messages:
r2
i(vi,v −i,λ i,λ −i) and z2
i (vi,v −i,λ i,λ −i),












i (vi,v −i,λ i,λ −i)|vi,λ i
¤
Buyer i0s expected payoﬀ at the beginning of t =2given actions that implement (r2,z2), is given by
u2
i(r2,z2,v i) ≡ ¯ r2
i(vi,λ i)vi − ¯ z2
i (vi,λ i).
For notational simplicity we ignore the superscript 2 from now on. Since we move on to t =2only if there
is no trade at t =1 , all that follows is conditional on no trade at t =1 .
13Given an assessment (σ,µ), a mechanism M1 determines a joint distribution over messages that each
buyer may receive. This is common knowledge, since the mechanism is observed by all buyers. To see this
consider a typical history for buyer i at t =2 . It consists of the mechanism that the seller proposed at t =1 ,
M1, the action that he chose at t =1 ,s 1
i, and a message that he received from the seller, ˆ λi. A message ˆ λi
can be mapped via the information disclosure policy to a set of possible vectors of messages for the other
agents, call it Λ−i(ˆ λi)=
n
λ−i ∈ Λ−i : λ =( ˆ λi,λ −i)
¯ ¯M1,C,σ
o
. An element of Λ−i(λi), call it ˆ λ−i can be
again, using the information disclosure policy, mapped back to a set of possible vectors of actions S−i(ˆ λ−i)= n
s−i ∈ S−i : λ−i(s−i)=ˆ λ−i
¯ ¯M1,C,σ
o
. Each of these possible vectors of actions can be mapped back to
a set of possible valuations using the strategy proﬁle: V (ˆ s−i)={v−i ∈ V−i : s−i(v−i)=ˆ s−i}.G i v e nˆ λi the




. Hence i0s posterior
distribution over the valuations of −i depends on M1,s 1 on λi a n do nt h es t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle- which of course
describes the seller’s information disclosure policy and the actions of the other buyers’ at t =1 . The same
holds for all agents, that is, at a given history and in particular, given a message they have received from
the seller, we can calculate their beliefs about their opponents’ valuations. Hence if i wants to determine
j0s beliefs over beliefs of his opponents -which as just said, are determined among others, by the message
j receives via the seller’s information disclosure policy - buyer i has to assess given a particular message,
say λi, what message j has received and with what probability. Let GS
i denote the seller’s posterior about
i0s valuation at the beginning of t =2after a history h2
S where trade has not taken place at t =1 ;GS
the seller’s joint posterior of v and GS
−i denote the seller’s beliefs over V−i. Also, let Gi denote i0s joint
posterior about v; Gi
−i denote i0s posterior about v−i , given a history h2
i and so forth.
When type vi of buyer i chooses at t =2the action speciﬁed by (σ,µ) for type v0
i, then his expected
payoﬀ at t =2is given by
u2
i(r,z,vi) ≡ ¯ ri(v0
i,λ i)vi − ¯ zi(v0
i,λ i).
When we keep λi ﬁxed, we omit it and write
u2
i(r,z,vi) ≡ ¯ ri(v0
i)vi − ¯ zi(v0
i).
Lemma 2 If at an information set the continuation strategy of i i sab e s tr e s p o n s et ot h ec o n t i n u a t i o n
strategies of −i and to the seller’s continuation strategy, then ¯ ri is increasing in vi.
The proof of this Lemma is identical to the step of establishing the monotonicity of ¯ pi in the proof of
Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 Let Yi denote the support of GS
i . Suppose that there exist vL
i ,vH
i on the boundary of Yi, such that
(vL
i ,vH







14In the remaining of this section we look at the continuation game after the history where all buyers
reject M1 at t =1 .
The solution at t =2after the history where all buyers reject M1.
Given Assumption O all buyers have observed this event and this is common knowledge. This implies
that the beliefs of i and the seller about −i are common and are common knowledge and this is true for all
i and all −i. Consider a PBE(σ,µ) and a history along the equilibrium path h2
S, where all buyers rejected
M1. From now on we use Yi to denote the set of types of i that reject M1 given (σ,µ). We assume that Yi
is measurable and it has strictly positive measure.
Given that along the equilibrium path the seller and the buyers use Bayes’ rule and the strategy proﬁle
to update beliefs, the closure of Yi is the support of the seller’s and −i ’s beliefs at t =2about vi. Then,
the probability density function of vi given h2






Yi fi(si)dsi if vi ∈ Yi
0 otherwise
. (8)
Since we are looking at the case where posterior beliefs are common this is the seller’s posterior as well as
j0s, j ∈ K and j 6= i. The closure of Y = Y1 × ... × YI is the support of the seller’s joint posterior at t =2
when all buyers reject.9 Given Assumption O, posterior beliefs after all buyers reject are independent, and
the density is given by g(v)=g1(v1)×g2(v2)×...×gI(vI). The game ends at period t =2 , hence the seller’s
problem at t =2is isomorphic to a static problem under commitment. Hence, the seller can, without loss
of generality, choose M2 among the class of direct revelation mechanisms, (DRM), that are incentive
compatible, (IC), and individually rational, (IR). The set of types at t =2is the support of the posterior.









I(v)) speciﬁes the corresponding expected payment. From now on we will omit
the superscript 2.
Consider the seller’s problem after the history where all buyers have rejected M1. At t =2the mech-










subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints
9From now on when we write Yi and Y we will actually mean their corresponding closures.
15¯ ri(vi)vi − ¯ zi(vi) ≥ ¯ ri(˜ vi)vi − ¯ zi(˜ vi), (IC)
for all vi,˜ vi ∈ Yi, and i ∈ I









Buyer i0s expected payoﬀ at the continuation game that starts at t =2when the seller employs the
DRM (r,z) and his valuation is vi is given by u2
i(r,z,vi)=¯ ri(vi)vi − ¯ zi(vi).
Since the seller may use any mechanism at t =1Yi, may not be a convex subset of the real line as
it is usually assumed in the mechanism design literature under commitment. Program 1 diﬀers from a
standard static problem in that the type space is not necessarily an interval. We consider a version of
Program 1, where the mechanism that the seller employs must satisfy IC and IR on the convex hull of Y.










subject to incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints
¯ ri(vi)vi − ¯ zi(vi) ≥ ¯ ri(˜ vi)vi − ¯ zi(˜ vi), (ICE)
for all vi,˜ vi ∈ ¯ Yi, and i ∈ I
¯ ri(vi)vi − ¯ zi(vi) ≥ 0 for all vi ∈ ¯ Yi and i ∈ I. (IRE)
Let R2 denote the seller’s expected revenue at the beginning of t =2 .
Proposition 1 Suppose that posterior beliefs are common and buyers valuations are independent. Let M2
denote the solution of Program 1 and ˆ M2 denote the solution of Program 2. Then
R2(M2)=R2( ˆ M2).
With the help of Lemma 3, Proposition 1 follows from Proposition 1 in Skreta (2003).
16From Proposition 1 it follows that it is without any loss to require the mechanism to satisfy IC and
IR on the convex hull of Yi. The solution of this problem follows Myerson closely - with some small
modiﬁcations in order to take care of the complications that arise from having gi(vi)=0for some v0
is.10






ri(v)[vigi(vi) − (1 − Gi(vi))]g−i(v−i)dv, (10)
subject to ¯ ri(vi) is increasing in vi for all i,





ri(v−i,s i)dsi, for all i ∈ I. (11)
Then r,z is the optimal auction mechanism at t =2 .
Proof. Let R2 denote the seller’s revenue at the continuation game that starts after the history that all












Using Lemma 2 in Myerson (1981) it can be rewritten as
Z
Y
Σi∈Iri(v)[vigi(vi) − (1 − Gi(vi))]g−i(v−i)dv − Σi∈Iu2
i(r,z,ai). (12)
Deﬁne
φi(vi,v −i)=[ vigi(vi) − (1 − Gi(vi))]g−i(v−i), (13)
and
Ji(vi)=[ vigi(vi) − (1 − Gi(vi))] (14)




Σi∈Iri(v)φi(vi,v −i)dv − Σi∈Ku2
i(r,z,ai). (15)
10In particular, because the expression vi−
1−Gi(vi)
gi(vi) is not always well deﬁned we use Ji(vi)=vigi(vi)−[1−Gi(vi)] instead.
Moreover, in the case that Ji fails to be strictly increasing, (this is the “general case” in Myerson), we have to take into
account the possibility that gi(vi)=0when we obtain the “ironed” J.
17The seller’s problem reduces to maximizing (15) subject to ¯ ri(vi) is increasing in vi for all i and Σi∈Iri(v) ≤
1. Also when zi is given by (11) then u2





Regular Case. Suppose that Ji is strictly increasing in vi. Let ξ2
i(Yi) denote the solution of Ji(vi)=0 ,
i ∈ I; if Ji(vi) > 0 for all vi ∈ Yi then let ξ2
i(Yi) denote the smallest element of Yi, then let Ξi(Yi)=
©
vi ∈ Yi : vi ≤ ξ2
i(Yi)
ª
. This set contains all elements of Yi such that i0s posterior virtual valuation is
negative and the set Ξ(Y ) deﬁned as
Ξ(Y )=×i∈IΞi(Yi) (16)
and contains all elements of Y such that the posterior virtual valuation of all buyers are negative. The
optimal allocation rule assigns the object to the buyer that has the highest posterior virtual valuation if it
is non-negative, that is
for v ∈ Ξ(Y ) set ri(v)=0for all i ∈ I;
for v ∈ Y \Ξ(Y ) set ri(v)=1if i = I(v,g)
and rj(v)=0 if j 6= I(v,g);
the payment given by (11),




If Ji is strictly increasing in i, and vi > ˜ vi, buyer i will win with vi whenever he wins with ˜ vi, hence
¯ ri(vi) ≥ ¯ ri(˜ vi). The optimal auction in the regular case assigns the object to the buyer with the highest φi,
w h i c hw ed e n o t eb yI(v,g), if this is non-negative. Note that φ0
is in our framework play a role similar to
the virtual valuations in the standard framework where gi > 0.
General Case. In the general case the optimal auction assigns the object to one of the buyers with
highest ‘ironed’ ˆ φi if it is non-negative. The proof of this and the derivation of the “ironed” virtual valuation
for the case that gi is not necessarily positive, (as is the case in the analysis of Myerson (1981)), can be
found in the Appendix.
Given the results obtained in this section we proceed to derive necessary conditions that an allocation
rule satisﬁes if it is implemented by a PBE.
184.3 Necessary Conditions at a PBE
Fix a PBE.At a PBEσi
B i sab e s tr e s p o n s et oσ−i
B and to σS. From Lemma 1 we have the restriction that
p must be such that ¯ pi,( d e ﬁn e di n( 1 ) )b ei n c r e a s i n gi nvi. The allocation rule must also satisfy feasibility
constraints pi(v) ≥ 0 and Σi∈Ipi(v) ≤ 1. Moreover, at a PBE the seller’s strategy has to be optimal
given her beliefs at the beginning of t =2after every history where trade has not taken place at t =1 ,
and these beliefs must be derived from the buyers’ strategies using Bayes’ rule. We have shown that given
Assumption O, when all the buyers reject M1, the seller will employ a mechanism at t =2that assigns
the object to the buyer with the highest (‘ironed’) virtual valuation if it is non-negative. From the above
observations it follows that if an allocation rule is implemented by a PBE it belongs in P :
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumptions O and 3 hold. If an allocation rule p is implemented at a PBE,
then it belongs in P, where P =

                
                
pi : V → [0,1],i ∈ K such that
¯ pi is increasing in vi and
pi(v)=0 , for all i ∈ K and v ∈ Ξ(Y ),
pi(v)=δ,if i = I(v,g) and pj(v)=0for j 6= I(v,g), and v ∈ Y \Ξ(Y )
0 ≤
P
i∈I pi(v) ≤ 1,a n dv ∈ V \Y
for some Y ∈ V ; Ξ(Y ) given by (16),









                
                
.
Note that P is actually a superset of allocation rules that can be implemented by assessments that are
PBE0s.
4.4 The Revenue Maximizing PBE














f(v)dv. As already noted P is a superset of the set of PBE−
implementable allocation rules, but it will turn out that a solution to (18) is PBE implementable.
Note ﬁrst that pC, the allocation rule that maximizes expected revenue under commitment, is not
feasible under non-commitment, since pC / ∈ P. We search among functions p that are elements of P.F o r
our purposes all equilibria that lead to the same p will be considered as equivalent since they guarantee
the same expected revenue for the seller.
First we establish that the seller can restrict attention to a subset of P which we call P∗. P∗ is a
subset of P with the following characteristics: the set of types that reject is convex, that is, and of the
19form Y =[ a1, ¯ v1] × ... × [aI, ¯ vI] for some (¯ v1,...,¯ vI) where ¯ vi ≥ ξi, and for every v ∈ V \Y t h eo b j e c ti s
assigned with probability one to the buyer with highest virtual valuation. As we will later demonstrate
the symmetric equilibrium of a sequence of second or ﬁrst price auctions implement allocation rules in P∗.
Deﬁnition 5 P∗=

                     
                     
pi : V → [0,1],i ∈ I such that
pi(v)=0 , for all i ∈ K and v ∈ Ξ(Y ), where Ξ(Y ) is given by (??)
pi(v)=δ,if i = I(v,g) and pj(v)=0
for j 6= I(v,g) and v ∈ Y \Ξ(Y )
pi(v)=1 ,i fi = I(v,f) and pj(v)=0
for j 6= I(v,f) and v ∈ V \Y
where I(v,f) ∈ argmax{i∈I:vi∈Vi\Yi} Φi(vi), and I(v,g) deﬁned in (17);










                     
                     
Lemma 4 P∗ is a subset of P
Proof. Take a p ∈ P∗ we would like to verify that p ∈ P. A moment’s look at the deﬁnitions of P and P∗
will convince the reader that the only thing we need to verify is that ¯ pi is increasing in vi.
First observe that for v ∈ V \Y there exist j ∈ I such that pj(v)=1which implies that for every such
v trade take place with probability 1 at t =1 . The only possibility that we move on at t =2is when every
buyer rejects, that is when v ∈ Y. This implies that for vi ∈ [ai,¯ vi]¯ pi(vi)=δ¯ ri(vi), where ¯ ri is given by
(9), and as we mentioned when we derived the solution of the seller’s problem at the beginning of the ﬁnal
period of the game after all buyers reject, ¯ ri(vi) is increasing in vi. So for vi ∈ [ai,¯ vi]¯ pi is increasing in
vi. Now for vi ∈ (¯ vi,b i] i participates in M1. The monotonicity of ¯ pi for vi ∈ (¯ vi,b i] follows from the fact
that given MHR for all vectors v such that vi has the highest virtual valuation- that is i ∈ I(v,f)−,t y p e
v0
i ≥ vi also does, that is pi(vi,v −i)=pi(v0
i,v −i)=1for all v−i. That is, pi is increasing in vi for vi ∈ (¯ vi,b i],
which clearly ensures that ¯ pi is increasing in vi ∈ (¯ vi,b i]. S of a rw eh a v ee s t a b l i s h e dt h a t¯ pi is increasing for
vi ∈ [ai,¯ vi] and for vi ∈ (¯ vi,b i]. Lastly we should verify that ¯ pi does not drop at ¯ vi. We take the convention
that ¯ vi rejects M1. This is without loss since ¯ vi is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting and moreover
it is of measure zero. Since ¯ vi ∈ Yi we have that ¯ pi(¯ vi) ≤ δF−i(¯ v−i). The reason for this is that ¯ vi can only
obtain the object only if everybody rejects which happens with probability F−i(¯ v−i). So even if he gets the
object with probability 1 at t =2 , once everybody has rejected, from the ex-ante point of view it must hold
¯ pi(¯ vi) ≤ δF−i(¯ v−i). In other words, the upper bound for ¯ pi(¯ vi) is δF−i(¯ v−i). Now type ¯ vi + ε where ε>0
and arbitrarily small, accepts M1 so he gets the object with probability one, at least when everybody else
20has rejected. This occurs with probability F−i(¯ v−i). Hence it holds that ¯ pi(¯ vi + ε) ≥ F−i(¯ v−i). Therefore
¯ pi is increasing in vi. This implies that P∗ ⊂ P.
Assumption TBR: Tie-Breaking Rule (TBR): Suppose that for all i ∈ I, i rejects M1 whenever he is
indiﬀerent between participating and rejecting.
The Proposition that follows establishes that maximizing R over P is equivalent to maximizing R over
P∗. This is done by showing that for each p ∈ P there exists ˆ p ∈ P∗ that generates higher expected revenue.
The main steps in establishing Proposition 4 are as follows.
Step 1: Assumung that i rejects M1 if indiﬀerent then types where i rejects are [ai, ¯ vi] for some
¯ vi ∈ [ai,b i] (Lemma 6 which employs Lemma 5)
Step 2. At a revenue maximizing allocation rule out of P, the cutoﬀ ¯ vi is greater or equal to the point
where a buyer’s virtual valuation is zero.
Intuition: The seller does not want to trade with strictly positive probability with types of
buyer i where his virtual valuation is strictly negative. (Lemma




Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumptions O, 3,T B Rand MHR hold. Then for each p ∈ P,t h e r ee x i s t s
ˆ p ∈ P∗ that raises higher expected revenue for the seller, that is R(ˆ p) ≥ R(p), so
max
p∈P∗ R(p)=m a x
p∈P
R(p).
and is established with the help of the following two Lemmas:
Lemma 5 Consider a PBE (σ,µ) and let Yi denote the set of types of buyer i that reject M1. Let ¯ Yi
denote its convex hull.Then for vi ∈ ¯ Yi\Yi it holds that ¯ pi(vi)=¯ pi(ˆ vi) where ˆ vi =s u p {˜ vi ∈ Yi s.t. ˜ vi ≤ vi}.
Lemma 6 Given TBR then for all i, that is the set of types that reject M1, is convex.
Proof. Consider a strategy proﬁle where the set of types that reject M1, that is Yi, is not convex. From the
previous Lemma it follows for all i when vi ∈ ¯ Yi\Yi buyer i is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting
M1. Given the tie-breaking rule, then for vi ∈ ¯ Yi\Yi, buyer i will reject. All types in ¯ Yi reject, which is by
deﬁnition convex.
This Lemma relies on the tie-breaking rule. Ideally one should show that the seller prefers to have ties
broken the way suggested above. This result can be established when the seller faces just one buyer, but
we have so far been unable to establish or provide a counter-example to it in the multi-buyer case.
21Lemma 7 At a revenue maximizing allocation rule out of P, the cutoﬀ, ¯ vi, is greater or equal to the point
where a buyer’s virtual valuation is zero, that is
¯ vi ≥ ξi.
From Lemma 7 it follows that at an optimal element of P we have that Ξ ⊂ Y. It is then easy to show
that an allocation rule that for each v ∈ V \Y assigns the object to the buyer with the highest virtual
valuation is the best we can hope for.
Theorem 1 Suppose that Assumptions O, 3,T B Rand MHR hold. Then, at the revenue maximizing
PBE, the seller at t =1employs a mechanism where each buyer can either claim a value above a buyer
speciﬁcc u t - o ﬀ, or claim the lowest possible value, (reject). The object is awarded with probability one to
the buyer to with the highest virtual valuation among all buyers who claimed a value above the cut-oﬀ.I f
no buyer claims a value above the cut-oﬀ no trade take place at t =1and we move on to t =2where the
seller employs a direct revelation mechanism that assigns the object to the buyer with the highest posterior
virtual valuation if it is non-negative.
Proof. From Proposition 4 we know that given Assumption O, the seller can look for the PBE that
generates the highest expected revenue, among ones that implement allocation rules in P∗. The proof of
the theorem consists of the following three steps: First we describe for any element of p ∈ P∗ a strategy
proﬁle that implements p. Second we choose the element of P∗ that is optimal for the seller, call it p∗ and
i ns t e pt h r e ew ev e r i f yt h a ta na s s e s s m e n tt h a ti m p l e m e n t sp∗ is a PBE of the game under consideration.
Step 1: Implementation of elements of P∗ :
A strategy proﬁle that implements an element of P∗ is as follows: The seller proposes M1 =( S1,γ1),
where S1
i = {ai} ∪ [¯ vi,b i] and γ1




i(vi,v −i)=1 if i = I(v,f),v i ∈ [¯ vi,b i]
=0 otherwise, that is for i 6= I(v,f),
where








i(v−i),v −i 6= a−i; if i = I(v,f)





















i(v−i)=i n f{vi such that Φi(vi) ≥ 0 and Φi(vi) ≥ Φj(vj), for j 6= i}
c2
i(v−i)=i n f{vi such that φi(vi) ≥ 0 and φi(vi) ≥ φj(vj), for j 6= i}
and
Ai(¯ vi)={v−i ∈ Y−i such that ¯ vi <c 2
i(v−i)}.
The price that buyer i pays at t =1whenever he is the only buyer participating, which is given by Z1
i , is
chosen such that type ¯ vi be indiﬀerent between revealing his true type or waiting a period. The mechanism
proposed at t =2is as follows: M2 =( S2,γ2) where S2
i =[ ai, ¯ vi] and γ2 is such that:
r2
i(vi,v −i)=1 if i = I(v,g); v ∈ Y \Ξ(Y )
=0 otherwise, that is for i 6= I(v,g)
r2
i(vi,v −i)=0 ; for all i when v ∈ Ξ(Y )
Payment :
z2
i (vi,v −i)=0 ; for all i when v ∈ Ξ(Y )
z2
i (vi,v −i)=c2
i(v−i) if i = I(v,g); v ∈ Y \Ξ(Y )
=0 otherwise, that is for i 6= I(v,g)
Given this strategy of the seller let us consider the following strategy proﬁle for the buyers, (along the path
determined by the seller’s strategy). For vi ∈ [ai,¯ vi] buyer i chooses ai at t =1and claims his true type
at t =2 . (Recall that at t =2the seller employs a direct mechanism M2.) For vi ∈ (¯ vi,b i] buyer i claims
vi at t =1 ;a n d¯ vi at t =2 .
23The allocation rule and the payment rule implemented by this assessment are given by
pi : V → [0,1],i ∈ I such that
pi(v)=0 , for all i ∈ I and v ∈ Ξ(Y )
pi(v)=δ,if i = I(v,g) and pj(v)=0
for j 6= I(v,g) and v ∈ Y \Ξ(Y )
pi(v)=1 ,i fi = I(v,f) and pj(v)=0
for j 6= I(v,f) and v ∈ V \Y
for I(v,f)deﬁned in (19) and I(v,g) deﬁn e di n( 17),
where Y =[ a1, ¯ v1] × ... × [aI, ¯ vI] and Ξ1 ⊂ Y.
xi(v)=0 if v ∈ Ξ(Y )
xi(v)=δc2
i(v−i) v ∈ Y \Ξ(Y ) if i = I(v,g)
=0 otherwise
xi(v)=c1
i(v−i) if vi ∈ (¯ vi,b i] and v−i ∈ V−i\Y−i and i = I(v,f)
xi(v)=0 if vi ∈ (¯ vi,b i] and v−i ∈ V−i\Y−i and i 6= I(v,f)
xi(v)=ξ1
i if vi ∈ (¯ vi,b i] and v−i ∈ Y−i .
Note that indeed the allocation rule p is an element of P∗, as we wanted to show.
Step 2: Find optimum p ∈ P∗.
An element of P∗ is indexed by ¯ v. That is, by varying ¯ v w ec a no b t a i nas t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle that implements





Y f(s)ds if v ∈ Y
0 otherwise
,
w h i c hi nt u r nd e t e r m i n e sΞ(Y ) via (16). Hence the allocation rule that raises maximal revenue for the seller
can be identiﬁed by choosing ¯ v optimally. In other words the seller can obtain the revenue maximizing











¯ vi ∈ [ai,b i].i∈ I
Following standard procedures it is easy to verify that this maximization problem is well deﬁned (the choice
set is compact, which is trivially true for this problem, and that the objective function is continuous.)11
Step 3: Implement p by a PBE
11Proof available upon request.
24First we need to verify that players’ strategies are best responses to the strategy of each other.
a) i0s strategy is a best response given σS and σB
−i.
In order to establish this we will use the allocation and payment rule (p,x) implemented by the assess-
ment under consideration.
The pair (p,x) implemented by the assessment under consideration can be viewed as a direct mechanism.
We will establish that it is incentive compatible and individually rational. These properties will be used
to verify that σi
B is a best response to σS and to σ−i
B . Note that the assessment under consideration
implements an allocation rule p with the property that ¯ pi be increasing in vi. This property holds if σi
B is
ab e s tr e s p o n s et oσ−i
B and to σS, but it is only a necessary condition. Therefore we need to verify that
for the strategy proﬁle under consideration it holds that σi
B is a best response to σS and to σ−i
B .
Establishing Feasibility of (p,x):












Notice that xi(vi,v −i)=pi(vi,v −i)vi−
R vi
ai pi(si,v −i)dsi since when v−i ∈ V−i\Y−i pi(vi,v −i)vi−
R vi
ai pi(si,v −i)dsi =
0 and xi(vi,v −i)=0 . T h es a m ei st r u ew h e nv−i ∈ Y−i but i 6= I(v,g), that is pi(vi,v −i)vi−
R vi
ai pi(si,v −i)dsi =
0=xi(vi,v −i) whereas if i = I(v,g) then pi(vi,v −i)vi−
R vi
ai pi(si,v −i)dsi = δc2







































xi(vi,v −i)f−i(v−i)dv−i + ξ1
iF−i(¯ v−i).
25Notice that for v−i ∈ Vi\Y−i we have that xi(vi,v −i)=0if i 6= I(v,f) and xi(vi,v −i)=c1
i(v−i) if
i = I(v,f). As before notice that
xi(vi,v −i)=pi(vi,v −i)vi −
Z vi
ai
pi(si,v −i)dsi, for vi ∈ (¯ vi,b i] and v−i ∈ V−i\Y−i (21)
since if i 6= I(v,f),p i(vi,v −i)vi−
R vi
ai pi(si,v −i)dsi =0whereas if i = I(v,f) then pi(vi,v −i)vi−
R vi
ai pi(si,v −i)dsi =
c1








































f−i(v−i)dv−i for vi ∈ (¯ vi,b i] and v−i ∈ Y−i.




pi(si,v −i)dsi = vi −
Z vi
¯ vi
1dsi − 0 for v−i ∈ Y−i such that ¯ vi <c 2
i(v−i),








δdsi for v−i ∈ Y−i such that ¯ vi ≥ c2
i(v−i)
which holds for v−i ∈ Y−i\Ai(¯ vi).
From (21) and (22) it follows that for vi ∈ (¯ vi,b i]
















and Σi∈Kpi(v) ≤ 1 for v ∈ V and pi(v) ≥ 0. From Lemma 2 in Myerson (1981) it follows that (p,x) is
incentive compatible and individually rational.
26From this observation it is immediate that σi
B is a best response to σS and σ−i
B : First observe that,
along the path, according to σi
B all possible sequences of actions (possible choices at t =1and at t =2
are determined by the mechanisms proposed by the seller) are chosen by some type. To see this, note that
at y p evi in [¯ vi,b i] claims vi at t =1and the game ends at t =1 , at y p eˆ vi in [ai, ¯ vi] chooses ai at t =1
and ˆ vi at t =2 . Suppose that type vi has a proﬁtable deviation from σi
B where he prefers to choose the
actions chosen by v0
i according to σi
B. Then it must be the case that
¯ pi(v0
i)vi − ¯ xi(v0
i) > ¯ pi(vi)vi − ¯ xi(vi)
but this is impossible since (p,x) is incentive compatible. Therefore σi
B is a best response to σS and to
σ−i
B .
b) We would like to establish that the buyers’ strategy is a best response at the continuation game that
starts at t =2 . Recall that given M1, the game continues at t =2only after the history where all buyers
reject M1. Then the seller proposes M2 which is chosen to be incentive compatible, which of course implies
that each buyer can do no better than by claiming his true type. This is exactly what σi
B dictates to each
type of each buyer. Hence for all i the buyer’s continuation strategy is a best response at the continuation
game that starts at t =2 .
c) The seller’s strategy is a best response at each node: Given σB the mechanism employed by the
seller at t =2is optimal given her posterior beliefs which are derived using Bayes’ rule from the strategies
of the other buyers. In order for an assessment to be a PBE the seller has to also choose M1 optimally.
By Proposition 4 this essentially reduces to choosing ¯ vi for all i optimally. (This choice will have impact
on the buyers’ best response and on what the seller proposes at t =2 ) .
d)Beliefs are derived using Bayes’ rule
Recall that along the path the only history when we move to t =2is whenever all buyers reject. The









and the joint posterior is given by g(v)=g1(v1) × g2(v2) × ... × gI(vI).
Our result demonstrates that at the optimum whenever at t =1the probability of trade with some
buyer is positive, than it is equal to one. This is also the case at the commitment optimum; but it is not
straightforward that this is optimal in a dynamic framework. One can think that the seller by using a
mechanism at t =1that consists of lotteries, may on one hand, reduce the probability of trade at t =1 ,
but on the other hand, lead to such posterior beliefs at t =2that will allow for higher surplus extraction.
That is, the seller could use t =1as an experimentation stage, that would allow her to obtain sharper
27information about the buyers’ valuations that she could in turn use to obtain more revenue at t =2 . Our
results show that it is not worthwhile for the seller to do so.
Assumption S, (Symmetry). The buyers are ex-ante symmetric, fi = fj for all i,j ∈ I
Lemma 8 Suppose that the probability density function of vi given Yi is given by gi(vi)=
(
fi(vi)
Fi(¯ vi) if vi ∈ [ai, ¯ vi]
0 otherwise
.





Fi(¯ vi)−Fi(vi). Then if gi satisﬁes MHR the following inequality must hold
f0
i(vi)[Fi(¯ v) − Fi(vi)] ≥− f2
i (vi). (24)
Now if fi satisﬁes MHR, we have that (4) holds. If f0
i ≥ 0 then (24) is automatically satisﬁed. If f0
i < 0
then we have that
f0
i(vi)[Fi(¯ v) − Fi(vi)] ≥ f0
i(vi)[1− Fi(vi)] ≥− f2
i (vi).
From Lemma 8 we have that if the prior, fi, satisﬁes MHR, then at a history where buyer i rejects M1,
so does the posterior gi.
Corollary 1 Assume O, MHR and that the buyers are ex-ante symmetric. Then the symmetric equi-
librium of the game where the seller runs a SPA or a FPA in each period with optimally chosen reserve
prices, generates maximal revenue for the seller.
Proof. From Proposition 4 we know that given Assumption O, the seller can look for the PBE that
generates the highest expected revenue, among ones that implement allocation rules in P∗. If buyers are
ex-ante symmetric then we have that12 ¯ vi =¯ vj for all i,j ∈ I and i 6= j, then the optimal allocation can
be implemented by a symmetric equilibrium of the game where the seller runs a SPA or a FPA in each
period with optimally chosen reserve prices.
Consider the symmetric equilibrium of a sequence of SPA with a reservation price in each period.
At t =1a SPA with a reservation price will assign the object to the buyer with the highest valuation,
(which due to symmetry and MHRis the buyer with the highest virtual valuation), among all buyers that
submit a bid above the reservation price that the seller has posted at t =1 . This follows from the fact that
conditional on submitting a bid above the reserve price, it is a dominant strategy for a buyer to submit a
bid equal to his true valuation. Let gi denote the posterior for i0s valuation, after buyer i does not submit
12Proof available upon request.
28a bid above the reserve price at t =1 . From Lemma 8 it follows that it satisﬁes the MHR.A tas e c o n d
price auction trade does not take place at t =1if no-one bids above the reservation price. Given ex-ante
symmetric buyers, at a symmetric equilibrium, the buyers are symmetric in the eyes of the seller at the
beginning of t =2as well. At t =2a SPA will assign the object to the buyer with the highest valuation,
(who due to symmetry and MHR is also the buyer with the highest virtual valuation), if his valuation is
above the reservation price posted at t =2 . Similar arguments hold for a FPA.
An example is computed in the next section. In the case of ex-ante symmetric buyers sometimes the
search for the optimal auction under non-commitment reduces to the search of the optimal sequence of
reserve prices in an environment where the seller runs in each period a SPA or a FPA with a reserve
price. For an example of optimally chosen reservation prices in SPA and FPA in a dynamic framework
see McAfee and Vincent (1997).
5 How to Calculate the Optimal Auction
The question is how to choose the optimal element of P∗. The numbers ¯ vi, i ∈ I completely describe an
element of this set. Why? These numbers determine the posterior which in turn determines the second
period cutoﬀs as well as the ranking of posterior virtual valuations for each vector of types. In particular
for all i, ¯ vi determines the posterior given by gi(vi)=
fi(vi)
Fi(¯ vi), that of course determines the buyers posterior
virtual valuation, vi −
1−Gi(vi)
gi(vi) , that in turn determines the cut-oﬀ that the seller will set at t =2 . The
cut-oﬀ is given by
ξ2
i(¯ vi) solves vi −
1 − Gi(vi)
gi(vi)
=0 ,i ∈ I;
Note that Lemma ?? implies that if the prior satisﬁes MHR so will the posterior. At t =2the optimal
M2 will assign the object to buyer i if vi −
1−Gi(vi)
gi(vi) ≥ 0 and vi −
1−Gi(vi)
gi(vi) ≥ vj −
1−Gj(vj)
gj(vj) for all j ∈ I such
that j 6= i. Given MHR, in the case where buyers are ex-ante symmetric, when ¯ vi =¯ vj for all i and j, then
vi −
1−Gi(vi)
gi(vi) ≥ vj −
1−Gj(vj)
gj(vj) reduces to
vi ≥ vj. (25)

















posterior virtual valuations φ1(v1)=
2v1
¯ v1






























" R 0.5¯ v1
0 δ(2v2 − 1)dv1 +
R (¯ v1/¯ v2)v2
0.5¯ v1 δ(2v2 − 1)dv1
+
R ¯ v2
(¯ v1/¯ v2)v2 δ(2v1 − 1)dv1 +
R 1







(2v2 − 1)dv1 +
Z v2
¯ v1






=0 .58333¯ v2δ¯ v2
1 − 0.75¯ v2δ¯ v1 − 1.0¯ v2¯ v2
1 +¯ v2¯ v1 +0 .58333δ¯ v1¯ v2
2 +0 .33333 − 0.33333¯ v3
2.
Maximizing with respect to ¯ v1 and to ¯ v2 we obtain the following solution which turns out to be symmetric.
δ ¯ v1 ¯ v2 Revenue
0 0.5000 0.5000 0.4167
0.2000 0.5152 0.5152 0.4085
0.3000 0.5254 0.5254 0.4046
0.4000 0.5384 0.5384 0.4010
0.5000 0.5555 0.5555 0.3976
0.7000 0.6129 0.6129 0.3928
0.9000 0.7646 0.7646 0.3967
0.9999 0.9994 0.9994 0.4166
1 0.9998 0.9998 0.4166
For this example the commitment benchmark is
¯ v1 =¯ v2 =0 .5 and Revenue=0.41667
13Theses are the cut-oﬀs describing the allocation rule and not reserve prices for period 1.
306C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper characterizes the optimal auction under non-commitment. In a two-period model, and assuming
“independent private values and risk neutral buyers”, we show that a revenue maximizing PBE−implementable
allocation rule can be implemented by a PBE of the game where the seller runs a ‘Myerson’ auction with
buyer-speciﬁcc u t o ﬀs in each period. A buyer can either claim a type above his/her cut-oﬀ or claim the
lowest possible type. If no buyer claims a value above his/her cut-oﬀ, no trade takes place in the ﬁrst
period, and the seller runs a ‘Myerson’ auction in the second period with lower cut-oﬀs. If the buyers are
ex-ante symmetric, this rule can be implemented by a sequence of second or ﬁrst price auctions with a
reservation price in each period. The reservation price decreases overtime.
This is the ﬁrst paper that studies a mechanism design problem under non-commitment in an environ-
ment where the principal faces many agents. A methodological contribution of the paper is to develop a
procedure to characterize the optimal dynamic incentive schemes under non-commitment in asymmetric
information environments with multiple agents, whose types are drawn from a continuum. One cannot
appeal to the standard revelation principle to solve such problems. Moreover the recent extension of the
revelation principle by Bester and Strausz (2001) does not apply in an environment where the principal
faces many agents, see Bester and Strausz (2000)). We hope that the method presented here will prove
useful for the characterization of the optimal dynamic incentive schemes under non-commitment in other
asymmetric information environments. The assumption of commitment, which makes the characterization
of the optimal incentive schemes a relatively straightforward task, implies that the principal will behave
in a time-inconsistent manner and it is not very appealing for many applications.
7A p p e n d i x
The Optimal Mechanism at t =2in the General Case
The analysis here follows closely Myerson (1981). More details and complete arguments can be found
there. Our objective is to illustrate how one takes care of the possibility that gi(vi)=0 . Here φi(vi,v −i)=
[vigi(vi) − (1 − Gi(vi))]g−i(v−i) plays the role of the virtual valuation in Myerson (because gi may be zero
one cannot factor it out and write vi −
(1−Gi(vi))
gi(vi) ).W h e n φi is strictly increasing in vi this is called the
regular case. In the general case this is not necessarily true. What we do here is that we ‘iron’ the part of
φi that depends on vi. This is called Ji and it is equal to Ji(vi)=[ vigi(vi) − (1 − Gi(vi))]. The ‘ironed’ Ji,









λHi(α)+( 1− λ)Hi(β) such that
α,β ∈ [ai,b i],λ ∈ [0,1] and λα +( 1− λ)β = vi
)
.






ˆ φi(vi,v −i)= ˆ Ji(vi)g−i(v−i);
ˆ ξi(Yi)=i n f
n












ˆ φi(vi,v −i). (27)
Consider the assignment function r given by
for v ∈ Ξ(Y ) set ri(v)=0for all i ∈ I;
for v ∈ Y \Ξ(Y ) set ri(v)=1if i ∈ I(v,g)
(where i i sc h o s e nr a n d o m l yi nc a s eo ft i e s )
and rj(v)=0 for j 6= I(v,g).





s.t. ¯ ri(vi) increasing
This follows by the following arguments. Since by construction ˆ Ji is increasing in i, and vi > ˜ vi, buyer
i will win with vi whenever he wins with ˜ vi, hence ¯ ri(vi) ≥ ¯ ri(˜ vi). The given r assigns the object to the
buyer with the highest ˆ φi, I(v,g), if this is non-negative.
32It remains to show that the mechanism described above solves (24) which is the actual objective function














φi(v) − ˆ φi(v)
i
dv. (28)





















Ji(vi) − ˆ Ji(vi)
i
dv (30)




[Hi(vi) − Li(vi)]d¯ ri(vi).
I tc a nb ee a s i l ys e e nt h a tHi(ai)=Li(ai) and Hi(bi)=Li(bi). Hence the ﬁrst term of the above expression




¯ ri(vi) ˆ Ji(vi)dvi − Σi∈I
Z
Yi
[Hi(vi) − Li(vi)]d¯ ri(vi)
or Z
Y
Σi∈Iri(v)ˆ φi(v)dv − Σi∈I
Z
Yi
[Hi(vi) − Li(vi)]d¯ ri(vi). (31)
Assigning the object to the buyer with the highest ˆ φi if it is non-negative maximizes the ﬁrst term of (31)
and makes the second term equal to zero. If Hi(vi) >L i(vi), then ˆ Ji is locally constant, therefore ri is
constant, which implies that d¯ ri(vi)=0 . Therefore the given mechanism maximizes
R
Y Σi∈Iri(v)ˆ φi(v)dv
which is equivalent to maximizing
R
Y Σi∈Iri(v)φi(v)dv.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3
Because at a PBE a buyer’s strategy is a best response at each node we have that
¯ ri(vH
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vH
i ) ≥ ¯ ri(vL
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vL
i ), (32)
holding all λi constant.
We now demonstrate that at a PBE the above inequality must hold with equality, that is
¯ ri(vH
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vH
i )=¯ ri(vL
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vL
i ) (33)
To see this, we argue by contradiction. Suppose that
33¯ ri(vH
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vH
i ) > ¯ ri(vL
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vL
i ).
Let ∆zi be such that
¯ ri(vH
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vH
i ) − ∆zi =¯ ri(vL
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vL
i ) (34)
and modify M2 as follows. Remove all actions that are not chosen by any type of buyer i and increase the
expected payment associated with all actions chosen by types vi >v H
i by a constant ∆zi, that is
ˆ zi(vH
i ,v −i,λ i,λ −i)=zi(vH
i ,v −i,λ i,λ −i)+∆zi, for all v−i ∈ Y i





i ,v −i,λ i,λ −i)
¤
= Ev−iEλ−i[zi(vH
i ,v −i,λ i,λ −i)+∆zi]=¯ zi(vH
i )+∆zi.
Before we move on observe that because at an equilibrium given λi, ¯ ri is increasing in vi, no type vi <v L
i
i sc h o o s i n gt h es a m ea c t i o na tt =2as vH
i , (or as any type vi ≥ vH
i ), since then it would be ¯ ri(vi)=
¯ ri(vH
i ) > ¯ ri(vL
i ).
Note that ˆ M2 is identical to M2 with the modiﬁcation that the payments associated with the actions
chosen by types greater or equal to vH
i are increased by ∆zi. Moreover ˆ M2 does not contain the actions of
M2 that were not chosen by any type of buyer i. We will establish that buyer i will still choose the same










i ,v −i,λ i,λ −i)
¤
.
We now show that at the resulting mechanism, call it ˆ M2, raises higher revenue for the seller.
Step 1: For every i choosing the same action as before is a best response.
Take vi ∈ Yi, with vi ≤ vL
i . Since at a PBE the buyer’s strategy is a best response at each node we
have
¯ ri(vi)vi − ¯ zi(vi) ≥ ˆ ri(v0
i)vi − ¯ zi(v0
i), for all v0
i ∈ Yi
w h i c hb yt h ed e ﬁnition of ˆ M2 implies
¯ ri(vi)vi − ˆ zi(vi) ≥ ˆ ri(v0
i)vi − ˆ zi(v0
i), for all v0





i and since ∆zi > 0, it holds that
¯ ri(vi)vi − ¯ zi(vi) ≥ ¯ ri(v0
i)vi − ¯ zi(v0
i) − ∆zi, for all v0
i ∈ Yi ,s . t .v0
i ≥ vH
i
34which, using the deﬁnition of ˆ M2 can be rewritten as
ˆ ri(vi)vi − ˆ zi(vi) ≥ ˆ ri(v0
i)vi − ˆ zi(v0
i), for all v0
i ∈ Yi s.t. v0
i ≥ vH
i . (35)
So far we have shown that if the buyer’s type vi is less or equal to vL
i , he does not have incentive to choose
an action chosen by some other type when the seller uses ˆ M2.
We now show that if vi = vH
i , type-vi buyer does not ﬁnd proﬁtable to choose an action chosen by
vi 6= vH
i . B e c a u s ew ea r ec o n s i d e r i n gaPBE, buyer i0s strategy is a best response
¯ ri(vH
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vH
i ) ≥ ¯ ri(v0
i)vH
i − ¯ zi(v0
i), for all v0
i ∈ Yi. (36)
Subtracting ∆zi from both sides of (36) we obtain
¯ ri(vH
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vH
i ) − ∆zi ≥ ¯ ri(v0
i)vH
i − ¯ zi(v0
i) − ∆zi.( 3 7 )
Using the deﬁnition of ˆ M2 (37) can be rewritten as
ˆ ri(vH
i )vH
i − ˆ zi(vH
i ) ≥ ˆ ri(v0
i)vH
i − ˆ zi(v0
i), for all v0
i ∈ Yi such that v0
i ≥ vH
i . (38)
Now we will demonstrate that vH
i does not have an incentive to choose an action chosen by vi ≤ vL
i . Recall
(34) that states that
¯ ri(vH
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vH
i ) − ∆zi =¯ ri(vL
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vL
i ).
Since the buyers strategy is a best response we have that
¯ ri(vL
i )vL
i − ¯ zi(vL
i ) ≥ ¯ ri(v0
i)vL
i − ¯ zi(v0
i), for all v0
i ∈ Yi; (39)
moreover ¯ ri is increasing in vi which implies that ¯ ri(vL
i ) ≥ ¯ ri(v0
i) for v0
i ≤ vL








i − ¯ zi(vL
i ) ≥ ¯ ri(v0
i)vH
i − ¯ zi(v0
i) (40)
which together with (34), reduces to
¯ ri(vH
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vH
i ) − ∆zi ≥ ¯ ri(v0
i)vH
i − ¯ zi(v0
i) (41)
for all v0
i ∈ Y i such that v0
i ≤ vL
i .
Using the deﬁnition of ˆ M2 (41) can be rewritten as
ˆ ri(vH
i )vH
i − ˆ zi(vH
i ) ≥ ˆ ri(v0
i)vH
i − ˆ zi(v0
i), for all v0
i ∈ Yi such that v0
i ≤ vL
i .
From (38) and (41) it follows that when the seller employs ˆ M2 type vH
i will choose the same action as
before. It is straightforward to show, that since vH
i does not have incentive to choose another action so
35does vi ≥ vH
i . We have therefore demonstrated that when the seller employs ˆ M2 buyers will ﬁnd optimal
to choose the same actions as when she employs M2.
Step 2: We also need to verify that buyer i gets at least his outside option payoﬀ which is zero. For
vi ≤ vL
i this follows from the fact that M2 guarantees buyer i payoﬀ zero, we therefore have
¯ ri(vL
i )vL
i − ¯ zi(vL
i ) ≥ 0. (42)
For vi ≥ vH
i it suﬃces to check that this is true for vH
i . From (42), and since vH
i >v L
i it follows that
¯ ri(vL
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vL




i − ˆ zi(vH
i )=¯ ri(vH
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vH
i ) − ∆zi =¯ ri(vL
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vL
i ) ≥ 0
Hence given ˆ M2 for all the buyers choosing the same actions as with M2 is a best response at t =2 ;moreover
ˆ M2 raises strictly higher revenue than M2. The seller has a proﬁtable deviation at t =2contradicting the
fact that we are considering a PBE.Therefore (33) indeed holds.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5
Consider a vi ∈ ¯ Yi\Yi. Since Yi is closed there exists an open interval around vi, that is not in Yi. Let
(vL
i ,vH
i ) denote the largest such interval. We will establish the result by showing that ¯ pi(vi)=¯ pi(vL
i ).
From Lemma 3 we know that after each history where buyer i rejects M1, the mechanism that the
seller employs at t =2must be such that
¯ ri(vL
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vL
i )=¯ ri(vH
i )vH
i − ¯ zi(vH
i ). (43)
Let ¯ p2
i denote the expected discounted probability, from the ex-ante point of the view, that buyer i obtains
the object at t =2and ¯ x2
i the expected discounted payment , from the ex-ante point of the view, that
buyer i has to incur at t =2 . For every history that trade does not occur at t =1and buyer i has rejected









i − ¯ x2
i(vH
i ). (44)
If a buyer rejects M1 he will never obtain the object at t =1no matter what his opponents do. Therefore
if vi rejects M1 then it must hold that ¯ pi(vi)=¯ p2
i(vi). Since types in Yi reject M1 we have that
¯ pi(vi)=¯ p2
i(vi) and ¯ xi(vi)=¯ x2
i(vi). (45)
Also from (44) and (45) we have that
¯ pi(vL
i )vH
i − ¯ xi(vL
i )=¯ pi(vH
i )vH
i − ¯ xi(vH
i ). (46)
36We now demonstrate that ¯ pi(vi)=¯ pi(vL
i ) for all vi ∈ (vL
i ,vH
i ).
We will argue by contradiction. Suppose that there exists vi ∈ (vL
i ,vH
i ) such that ¯ pi(vi) 6=¯ pi(vL
i ). Note
that since we are looking at a PBE it must be the case that
¯ pi(vi)vi − ¯ xi(vi) ≥ ¯ pi(vL
i )vi − ¯ xi(vL
i )
£
¯ pi(vi) − ¯ pi(vL
i )
¤
vi ≥ ¯ xi(vi) − ¯ xi(vL
i ).
Since ¯ pi is increasing we have that ¯ pi(vi) ≥ ¯ pi(vL
i ) and because ¯ pi(vi) 6=¯ pi(vL
i )) it holds that ¯ pi(vi) > ¯ pi(vL
i ).
From this observation and the fact that vH
i >v L
i , (recall that vi ∈ (vL
i ,vH
i )), we have that
£




i > ¯ xi(vi) − ¯ xi(vL
i ) or
¯ pi(vi)vH
i − ¯ xi(vi) > ¯ pi(vL
i )vH




i − ¯ xi(vi) > ¯ pi(vH
i )vH
i − ¯ xi(vH
i ),
which implies that vH
i can beneﬁt by mimicking the behavior of vi. Contradiction. Therefore ¯ pi(vi)=¯ pi(vL
i )
for all vi ∈ (vL
i ,vH
i ).
P r o o fo fL e m m a
Given the TBR we know that the set of types of buyer i that reject M1 will be of the form [ai,¯ vi].
Let ¯ vi denote the highest type of buyer i that rejects M1, that is ¯ vi is greater or equal to ξ1
i which, as the
reader may recall, is deﬁned by
ξ1




We want to establish that at a revenue maximizing PBE ¯ vi ≥ ξ1
i for all i. This inequality says that
the seller never wants to trade with strictly positive probability at t =1with a buyer whose virtual
valuation is strictly negative. Let us consider buyer i and suppose that for vi ∈ [ai, ¯ vi] buyer i rejects M1
with probability one at t =1 . Then the seller’s posterior beliefs after the buyer rejects M1 are given by
Gi(vi)=
Fi(vi)













Fi(¯ vi) − Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
,
Given this posterior virtual valuation we know that at t =2buyer i will never receive the object with




i solves vi −
Fi(¯ vi) − Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
=0 . (47)
37From Lemma 8 we know that if the prior satisﬁes MHR so will a posterior that is a downward truncation
of the prior distribution. Hence (47) has a unique solution. Moreover this cut-oﬀ can be alternative
obtained as the solution of the optimal price by a monopolist who is facing a downward sloping demand
[Fi(¯ vi) − Fi(ξ2
i)]. The monopolist problem is
[Fi(¯ vi) − Fi(ξ2
i)]ξ2
i
The FOC necessary conditions for a maximum (which are also suﬃcient given MHR), are
[Fi(¯ vi) − Fi(ξ2
i)] − fi(ξ2
i)ξ2
i =0 or since fi(ξ2
i) > 0
vi −





Since fi is continuous so will Fi which ensures continuity of the monopolists objective function. From the
Theorem of the Maximum we then have that ξ2
i is a continuous function of ¯ vi and hence it is diﬀerentiable
almost everywhere. Let us examine the optimal cut-oﬀ for buyer i ignoring the fact that there exist other








Let us now diﬀerentiate with respect to ¯ vi : we obtain that







− ¯ pi(¯ vi)Ji(¯ vi)fi(¯ vi) (48)







by the monotonicity of ¯ pi we have that
¯ pi(¯ vi) ≥ δ¯ ri(¯ vi);
from Lemma 6 in Skreta 2004, we have that ξ2





From the last two observations it follows that (48) is strictly positive for ¯ vi <ξ 1
i since if this is the case
we have Ji(¯ vi) < 0 and Ji(ξ2
i(¯ vi)) < 0. From these arguments alone we could conclude at the revenue
maximizing PBE it cannot be the case that ¯ vi <ξ 1
i. B u tw eh a v ei g n o r e dt h ee ﬀect of a change of ¯ vi of the
probabilities of obtaining the object in the second period. A change in ¯ vi will aﬀect also q2
j for j ∈ {1,...,I}
via the eﬀect that it will have on the ranking of the virtual valuations. Recall that buyer i wins the object
38at t =2if his posterior virtual valuation is the highest among all ones and it is non-negative, that is we
must have
vi −
Fi(¯ vi) − Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
≥ vj −




Fi(¯ vi) − Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
≥ 0
there is a special issue here - the non-negativity constraint does not depend of the whole vector of types.
Now let us consider a small increase in ¯ vi, that is ¯ vi +ε, for some ε>0, than the ranking will change. Let
ˆ vi, ˆ v1 denote the vector of types where
ˆ vi −
Fi(¯ vi) − Fi(ˆ vi)
fi(ˆ vi)
= v1 −
F1(¯ v1) − F1(ˆ v1)
f1(ˆ v1)
and i may win with ¯ vi but may loose with ¯ vi + ε, in which case the object goes to 1. Now the vector of
valuations where the inequality ﬂips is (ˆ v1,ˆ vi,....) and the same for the remaining of the buyers. Let r2(v)
denote the allocation at t =2given ¯ vi and let ˆ r2 denote the allocation rule at t =2given cut-oﬀ ¯ vi + ε.
The vector of types where these two rules diﬀe ra r ea tp o i n t sw h e r et h er a n k i n go fi0s virtual valuation









i(v) for all v ∈ Y except the vectors of valuation where the ranking of virtual valuations
changes all candidates for that are
ˆ v1, ˆ vi,v 2,v 3,...,v I, where v2 ∈ Y2,..,v I ∈ YI
and so forth for all buyers, but these set of vectors is of measure zero. (we have ﬁxed ˆ v1,ˆ vi,...) so when we
integrate with respect to ˆ v1 and to ˆ vi we will get zero. In short the eﬀect of a change in ¯ vi on the second





i(v) − ˆ r2
i(v)]Ji(v)f(v)dv =0
It will only aﬀect the allocation for a vector of types of measure zero. Hence our preliminary analysis
captures the eﬀect of ¯ vi. We can hence conclude that at the revenue maximizing PBE it cannot be the
case that ¯ vi <ξ 1
i.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4










also we use ξ1
i to denote the solution to Φi(vi)=0 . Given MHR for all vi ≥ ξ1
i we have that Φi(vi) ≥ 0
and for all vi <ξ 1
i we have that Φi(vi) < 0. We designate as Ξ1
i =[ ai,ξ1
i] the set of i0s valuations such that
Φi(vi) is negative, and by Ξ1 the set of vectors v =( v1,....,vI) where the virtual valuations of all buyers
are negative, that is Ξ1 = ×i∈I[ai,ξ1
i].We now continue with the proof.
Consider an assessment (σ,µ) that implements an allocation rule p ∈ P. Let Y denote the support of
the seller’s posterior after all buyers reject M1 and let M2 denote the mechanism that the seller employs
at t =2after all buyers reject. We assume that Y has strictly positive measure. Given the imposed
tie-breaking rule Y i sc o n v e x ,a n df r o mL e m m a7w eh a v et h a tΞ1 ⊂ Y. We show that there exist ˆ p ∈ P∗
such that R(ˆ p) ≥ R(p).
Now consider an assessment (ˆ σ,ˆ µ), that implements an allocation rule ˆ p such that for v ∈ V \Y ˆ p
assigns the object with probability 1 to the buyer with the highest virtual valuation, that is
for v ∈ V \Y ˆ pi(v)=
(
1 if i = I(v,f)
0 otherwise
.
Let ˆ M1 denote the mechanism that the seller proposes at t =1according to (ˆ σ,ˆ µ). Types in Y reject ˆ M1.
At t =2after the history where all buyers have rejected ˆ M1, the seller employs M2 that is optimal given
for v ∈ Y all buyers at t =1reject M1 in the ﬁrst period, that is for v ∈ Y we have that
ˆ p(v)=p(v) and ˆ x(v)=x(v).( 4 9 )
From Proposition 2 we know that M2 assigns the object at t =2with probability 1 to the buyer that has
the highest posterior virtual valuation. Given this observation note that ˆ p is an element of P∗. We now
proceed to show that ˆ p generates higher revenue for the seller than p.









0 · Φi(vi)]f(v)dv. (50)
Then because of (49)
R(ˆ p) − R(p)=
Z
V \Y
[ΦI(v,f)(vI(v,f)) − Σi∈I¯ pi(v)Φi(vi)]f(v)dv ≥ 0 (51)
40where the last inequality follows from the fact that for all i ∈ I and v ∈ V \Ξ1 ΦI(v,f)(vI(v,f)) ≥ Φi(vi) ≥ 0
(Recall that in this case Ξ1 ⊂ Y ).
From (51) we have that
R(ˆ p) − R(p) ≥ 0.
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